AML Scenario Gap Finder
Regime

Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia): what it asks of a monitoring programme

The Australian Act and Rules as held, on the current compilations: the ML/TF risk assessment and its review, the AML/CTF compliance officer and the independent evaluation of the AML/CTF program, ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions, customer due diligence, enhanced due diligence and PEPs, targeted financial sanctions, the travel rule, and the suspicious matter, threshold transaction and international value transfer reports.

Shown when Australia is ticked.

Typologies anchored here

50
TypologyObligation
Cash structuring below the reporting thresholdAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 43
Large cash deposits and withdrawalsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 43
Cash-intensive business out of lineAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Cash bought into monetary instrumentsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Cash withdrawn abroadAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Rapid movement of fundsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Transfers between related accountsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Internal and suspense accountsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Loan paid down from unexplained fundsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Funnel accountsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Third-party depositsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Money mulesAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Many-to-one and one-to-manyAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Shell and front companiesAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 28(2)(d)
High-risk jurisdictionsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 46
Cross-border activity out of profileAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 46
Over and under invoicingAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Letter of credit and document anomaliesAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Trade paid by an unrelated partyAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Politically exposed personsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 28(2)(e) · AML/CTF Act s 32
Correspondent and nested activityAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Private banking and high net worthAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Money services business customersAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 28(3)
High-risk customer segmentAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 32
Charities and non-profitsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Dormant account reactivationAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(b)-(c)
Activity above the expected profileAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(b)-(c)
New accounts with outsized activityAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(b)-(c)
Round amountsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
VelocityAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Structuring below the funds-transfer recordkeeping lineAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Sanctions name screeningAML/CTF Rules 5-3
Sanctioned ownership and controlAML/CTF Rules 5-3
Comprehensively sanctioned geographiesAML/CTF Rules 5-3
Sectoral sanctionsAML/CTF Rules 5-3
Missing originator or beneficiary informationAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 64 · AML/CTF Act s 65
Beneficiary name does not match the accountAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Check kiting and returned itemsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Remote deposit duplicatesAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Exploitation of older customersAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Account takeoverAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Scam payments by the customerAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Business email compromiseAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Prepaid loading and card cash-outAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Transaction laundering through merchantsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Human trafficking red flagsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Drug trafficking proceedsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Terrorist financing indicatorsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) · AML/CTF Act s 41
Proliferation financingAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)
Bribery and corruption proceedsAML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a)

Every obligation cited, quoted

17 of the 67 held

The requirement text is our statement of each clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text; it is not the instrument verbatim. Rows the export flags as shared evidence are never shown.

AML/CTF Act s 26C ML/TF risk assessment before providing designated services

A reporting entity must undertake an ML/TF risk assessment identifying and assessing the risks of money laundering, financing of terrorism and proliferation financing it may reasonably face in providing its designated services, with steps appropriate to the nature, size and complexity of its business (for a lead entity, of every reporting entity in its group, s 26U). Where it provides services through an Australian permanent establishment it must have regard to the kinds of designated services (including new or emerging technologies), the kinds of customers, the delivery channels (including new technologies), the countries it deals with, information AUSTRAC communicates to it about its risks, and matters in the Rules. Section 26E prohibits commencing to provide a designated service to a customer unless the assessment complies with sections 26C and 26D; each service in Australia, and each day of foreign-establishment service, is a separate civil penalty contravention.

What an examiner asks to see: Documented ML/TF risk assessment covering ML, TF and proliferation financing; Risk factor analysis by designated service, customer type, delivery channel and country, including new technologies; Record of AUSTRAC risk information (sector risk assessments, alerts) considered; Evidence the assessment was complete before the first designated service was provided; Senior manager approval record (s 26P)
Where programmes usually fall short: Proliferation financing omitted or treated as out of scope without a documented low-risk assessment; Generic industry template not tailored to the entity's own services and channels
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 26D Review and update the ML/TF risk assessment on triggers and at least every 3 years

The ML/TF risk assessment must be reviewed to identify new or changed risks when there is a significant change to any matter in s 26C(3), when AUSTRAC communicates risk information to the entity, when the Rules require (Rules 5-1: an independent evaluation report with adverse findings on the risk assessment, reviewed as soon as practicable after the governing body receives the report), and in any event at least once every 3 years. A change within the entity's control must be reviewed before it occurs; one outside its control, or AUSTRAC information, as soon as practicable afterwards. The review is proportionate to the business, and the assessment must be updated to address issues found: before a controlled change occurs, otherwise as soon as practicable after the review.

What an examiner asks to see: Risk assessment review log with trigger, date and outcome; Change management procedure that routes new products, channels, technologies and markets to a pre-launch risk review; Register of AUSTRAC communications and the resulting reviews; Evidence of a full review within the last 3 years; Updated assessment and governing body notification (s 26P(2))
Where programmes usually fall short: Product launches not linked to a risk assessment review before go-live; Only calendar reviews; event triggers not operated
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 26F(4)(f) Independent evaluation of the AML/CTF program at least every 3 years

The AML/CTF policies must provide for independent evaluations of the AML/CTF program at a frequency appropriate to the nature, size and complexity of the business and at least once every 3 years (s 26F(4)(f)). Rules 5-10 requires each evaluation to assess the steps taken in undertaking or reviewing the risk assessment and the design of the policies against the Act and Rules, to test compliance with the policies and whether the entity is appropriately identifying, assessing, managing and mitigating its risks, to produce a written independent evaluation report, and to deliver it to the governing body and the approving senior managers; the policies must say how the entity responds to the report.

What an examiner asks to see: Independent evaluation reports within the last 3 years; Evaluation scope covering risk assessment process, policy design, compliance testing and effectiveness testing; Evidence of the evaluator's independence from the functions evaluated; Delivery record to the governing body and approving senior managers; Management response and remediation tracking
Where programmes usually fall short: Evaluation limited to a desktop policy review without testing; Evaluator involved in designing or operating the controls
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 26J Designate a qualified AML/CTF compliance officer with authority and independence

The reporting entity must designate an individual as its AML/CTF compliance officer, employed or engaged at management level and with sufficient authority, independence and access to resources and information to perform the role effectively. The individual must be an Australian resident where the entity provides services through an Australian permanent establishment, and a fit and proper person; Rules 5-14 lists the matters to weigh: competence, skills, knowledge, diligence, expertise and judgement for the entity's size and complexity; good character, honesty and integrity; serious-offence convictions (subject to the spent convictions scheme); adverse findings in civil, criminal, regulatory or disciplinary processes about management or professional conduct; bankruptcy or a personal insolvency agreement; and material conflicts of interest. The compliance officer oversees and coordinates day-to-day compliance and the operation of the policies and communicates with AUSTRAC (s 26L).

What an examiner asks to see: Written designation of the compliance officer and role description reflecting s 26L functions; Fit and proper assessment against each Rules 5-14 matter, with evidence; Organisation chart showing management-level position and reporting lines; Resourcing and budget for the compliance function; Evidence of Australian residency
Where programmes usually fall short: Compliance officer below management level or reporting through the business line; Fit and proper assessment not documented or not refreshed
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 28(2)(d) Beneficial owners and control structure

For a non-individual customer the entity must establish the identity of each beneficial owner: an individual who ultimately owns, directly or indirectly, 25% or more of the customer or who controls it directly or indirectly (control includes practical influence over financial and operating policies, s 11). Rules 6-7 treats the matter as established for listed public companies subject to beneficial ownership disclosure, government bodies, and customers controlled by either; Rules 6-8 allows, where all reasonable steps fail and are recorded, identifying and risk-appropriately verifying the chief executive officer or equivalent, and requires the chief executive's identity where the customer has no beneficial owner. Simplified measures for regulated or strata customers are in Rules 6-18.

What an examiner asks to see: Ownership and control structure charts for non-individual customers; Beneficial owner identification and verification records at 25% and by control; Records of reasonable steps and difficulties where beneficial owners could not be identified; Evidence supporting listed company or government body treatment
Where programmes usually fall short: Only shareholding checked; control through other means ignored; Indirect ownership through layers not traced
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 28(2)(e) Politically exposed person and sanctions determination; source of wealth and funds for PEPs

Initial CDD must establish whether the customer, any beneficial owner, any person on whose behalf the customer receives the service or any person acting for it is a politically exposed person (domestic, foreign or international organisation, including family members and close associates) or a person designated for targeted financial sanctions. Where a foreign PEP is involved, or a domestic or international organisation PEP and the customer's ML/TF risk is high, the entity must also establish the PEP's source of wealth and source of funds (Rules 6-23). The involvement of a foreign PEP also makes enhanced CDD mandatory (s 32(c)).

What an examiner asks to see: PEP screening at onboarding for all relevant persons, with list source and match handling; PEP classification (foreign, domestic, international organisation, family member, close associate); Source of wealth and funds evidence for relevant PEPs; Sanctions screening results for the same persons
Where programmes usually fall short: Only the account holder screened, not beneficial owners or agents; Family members and close associates not in scope of screening
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 28(3) Identity verification, the customer's ML/TF risk and risk-based KYC collection and verification

To establish the s 28(2) matters the entity must: for an individual, take reasonable steps to establish the customer is who they claim to be; identify the customer's ML/TF risk from KYC information reasonably available before commencing, taking into account (for Australian establishments) its ML/TF risk assessment, the kind of customer, the designated services, the delivery channels, the countries dealt with and Rules matters; collect KYC information appropriate to that risk; and verify, using reliable and independent data, so much of it as is appropriate to that risk. Collection and verification may be done by an agent, the entity remaining liable (s 37). Where an individual genuinely cannot obtain or access identity evidence, the matter is taken to be established if reasonable steps were taken, the risk-based steps were followed using reasonably available data and additional risk is managed under the policies (Rules 6-10).

What an examiner asks to see: Customer risk rating methodology and model documentation; Risk rating recorded for each customer before service commencement; Verification standards specifying reliable and independent data sources by risk level; Records of verification performed (documents, electronic checks, results); Procedure for customers who cannot provide standard identification
Where programmes usually fall short: Customer risk rating assigned after onboarding or not at all; Same verification depth for all risk levels
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours

A reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.

What an examiner asks to see: Transaction monitoring rules and scenarios mapped to the entity's risks and to the Rules 6-35 offence list; Scenario tuning and coverage testing records; Alert volumes, disposition and escalation metrics; Manual monitoring procedures for non-automated channels; Model validation of monitoring systems
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(b)-(c) Review the assessment of the customer's ML/TF risk and refresh KYC information

For business relationships the entity must review and where appropriate update its assessment of the customer's ML/TF risk when a s 28(4) risk matter changes significantly, when unusual transactions or behaviours arise, and when the Rules require (a nested services customer at least every 2 years); and review, update and reverify KYC information at a frequency appropriate to the customer's risk, when it doubts the adequacy or veracity of KYC information, and when the Rules require (a customer or associated person becoming a foreign PEP, or a high-risk domestic or international organisation PEP, Rules 6-24; nested services customers every 2 years or when a new kind of nested service starts, Rules 6-26). Where enhanced CDD applies because of high risk, a suspicion or a high-risk jurisdiction, the refresh must ensure source of wealth and funds information is held where relevant (Rules 6-21).

What an examiner asks to see: Periodic review schedule by risk rating; Event-driven review triggers (alerts, adverse media, PEP status change); Records of KYC refresh and reverification; Risk rating change history with reasons
Where programmes usually fall short: Risk ratings set at onboarding and never revisited; No trigger-based reviews after unusual activity
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 32 Enhanced CDD when risk is high and in the mandatory cases

Enhanced CDD measures appropriate to the customer's risk must be applied in initial and ongoing CDD where the customer's ML/TF risk is high; a suspicious matter reporting obligation has arisen and the entity proposes to continue serving the customer; the customer or an associated person is a foreign PEP; the customer or an associated person is in, or was formed in, a jurisdiction for which the FATF has called for enhanced due diligence; the service is part of a nested services relationship; or the Rules specify (Rules 6-20: services with no apparent economic or legal purpose, unusually complex or large transactions, unusual patterns). (One Rules case, on physical currency received in an exchange service this tool does not cover, is left out.) Where enhanced CDD applies for high risk, a suspicion or a FATF-listed jurisdiction, source of wealth and source of funds become initial CDD matters where relevant to the risk (Rules 6-21).

What an examiner asks to see: Enhanced CDD procedure listing every mandatory trigger; Enhanced CDD files: source of wealth and funds evidence, senior management approval, enhanced monitoring; FATF high-risk jurisdiction list maintenance and screening; Records of continued-relationship decisions after SMRs
Where programmes usually fall short: FATF call-for-action jurisdictions not screened for formation or presence; Customers kept after an SMR without enhanced CDD
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 41 Report suspicious matters within 3 business days, or 24 hours for terrorism financing

A suspicious matter reporting obligation arises when an entity provides or proposes to provide a designated service to a person, or is asked or approached about a service it ordinarily provides, and it suspects on reasonable grounds that the person or their agent is not who they claim to be, that information it has may be relevant to investigating or prosecuting tax evasion, a Commonwealth, State or Territory offence, or proceeds of crime enforcement, or that the service is preparatory to, or information relevant to, a financing of terrorism or money laundering offence. The report goes to the AUSTRAC CEO in the approved form with the Rules information and a statement of the grounds for suspicion within 3 business days of forming the suspicion (5 business days where part of the information may be another person's privileged material, with an LPP form), or within 24 hours for terrorism financing. A report may be withheld where all the grounds are privileged. The obligation does not extend to services from foreign establishments (other than item 32A). Reports can be amended or withdrawn only at the AUSTRAC CEO's request (Rules 9-9B). Civil penalty provision.

What an examiner asks to see: SMR procedure and decision records with suspicion date and time; Lodgement confirmations showing timeliness against 3 business days and 24 hours; Quality of the statement of grounds in sampled reports; LPP forms where privilege is claimed; Metrics on SMR volumes and timeliness
Where programmes usually fall short: Clock started at case closure rather than when suspicion formed; Grounds for suspicion stated as a transaction description only
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 43 Report threshold transactions of $10,000 or more in physical currency within 10 business days

Where a designated service involves a threshold transaction (a transfer of physical currency of $10,000 or more, or a transaction the regulations specify), the entity must report it to the AUSTRAC CEO within 10 business days in the approved form with the Rules 9-5 to 9-8 information. It does not apply to services from foreign establishments (other than item 32A), to item 54 AFSL arranging services, to ADI-to-ADI services or between exchange settlement account holders using those accounts. Structuring transactions to avoid the report is an offence (s 142). Civil penalty provision.

What an examiner asks to see: Cash transaction capture across all channels; TTR lodgement reports with timeliness evidence; Reconciliation of cash transactions to TTRs; Monitoring for structuring below $10,000
Where programmes usually fall short: Cash transactions in some channels (branches, agents, ATMs) not captured; Late lodgement due to batch failures
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 46 Report international value transfer services within 10 business days

An entity that commences to provide an international value transfer service (an item 29 or 30 transfer taking value into or out of Australia, Rules 8-9 defining where value is) through an Australian establishment must report it to the AUSTRAC CEO within 10 business days after passing on or receiving the transfer message, in the approved form or Rules manner. No report is needed if within that period it reasonably determines the transfer will not occur and takes reasonable steps to stop it. The obligation may, or where the Rules require must, be discharged by an intermediary institution under a written agreement. For registered remittance affiliates the obligation falls on the network provider (Rules 9-10). Civil penalty provision.

What an examiner asks to see: IFTI or IVTS report lodgement records and reconciliation to payment volumes; Agreements where an intermediary reports on the entity's behalf; Procedure for cancelled transfers
Where programmes usually fall short: Inbound transfers not reported; Reports missing where intermediary reporting was assumed but not agreed
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 64 Ordering institution: collect, verify and pass on payer and payee information

Before passing on a transfer message or otherwise giving effect to a transfer of value (money or property) accepted for a payer, the ordering institution must collect the information the Rules specify and verify it where required under ss 28 and 30, pass the specified information to the next institution with or before the transfer, and give it to any other institution in the chain on request as soon as practicable. Rules 8-3 sets the information by case: generally payer information and the payee's full name, with tracing information passed on; BECS, BPAY and DEFT domestic transfers pass tracing information only; batch transfers pass payer information once; merchant payments and refunds pass the card number; ATM cash withdrawals pass the card number. Rules 5-17 treats policies requiring a response within 3 business days of a sufficient request as compliant. Civil penalty provisions. (One kind of value and one Rules case that this tool does not cover are left out here.)

What an examiner asks to see: Payment message field mapping to Rules 8-3 information by payment type; Verification of payer information through CDD; Records of information passed on and response times to chain requests; Exception reports for incomplete outgoing messages
Where programmes usually fall short: Payer address or identifier truncated in legacy message formats; Requests from beneficiary institutions not answered within 3 business days
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 65 Beneficiary institution: monitor incoming information and act on gaps

A beneficiary institution making transferred value available to a payee must take reasonable steps to monitor whether it has received the information the Rules specify (Rules 8-4) and whether the payee information is accurate. Where information is missing and not otherwise obtained, or payee information is inaccurate, it must, in accordance with its AML/CTF program, refuse to make the value available or take such other action as it determines; Rules 5-18 requires the policies to set out the monitoring steps and how it decides to release value or request more information. Civil penalty provision for the monitoring duty.

What an examiner asks to see: Incoming payment screening for missing originator and payee fields; Decision records on holding, rejecting or requesting information; Payee name match checks
Where programmes usually fall short: No detection of incomplete incoming messages; Missing information repeatedly accepted from the same counterparty without escalation
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 96 Correspondent banking due diligence, senior officer approval and ongoing assessments

Before entering a correspondent banking relationship involving a vostro account a financial institution must carry out a Rules 7-1 due diligence assessment of the ML, TF, proliferation financing and serious crime risks (ownership, control and management of the respondent and its parent; its business, customers and the transactions to be carried; the countries involved and the quality of their AML/CTF regulation and supervision; the respondent's AML/CTF controls; its and its group's reputation for AML/CTF or sanctions actions; and for payable-through accounts, its CDD on customers with access and its ability to provide that information) and record it in writing; a senior officer must approve having regard to the assessed risks and the adequacy of the correspondent's own program (Rules 7-2). Within 20 business days of entry it must record each party's responsibilities. While the relationship continues it must repeat the assessment at risk-based times and at least every 2 years (Rules 7-3, 7-4), record each within 10 business days, and have a senior officer review the record within 20 business days and decide whether to remain. Civil penalty provisions.

What an examiner asks to see: Respondent due diligence files covering each Rules 7-1 matter; Senior officer approvals before entry and continuation decisions; Written allocation of responsibilities within 20 business days; Ongoing assessments at least every 2 years with records inside 10 business days
Where programmes usually fall short: Relationships entered on the strength of a questionnaire only; No written responsibilities record
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Rules 5-3 Targeted financial sanctions policies

Under s 26F(3)(e) and Rules 5-3 the AML/CTF policies must deal with ensuring that, in providing designated services, the reporting entity does not make assets available to, or for the benefit of, a person designated for targeted financial sanctions under the Autonomous Sanctions Act 2011 or the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945, and does not use or deal with, or allow or facilitate the use of or dealing with, assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such a person. Initial CDD must also establish whether the customer, its beneficial owners, persons it acts for and persons acting for it are designated (s 28(2)(e)).

What an examiner asks to see: Sanctions policy covering asset freezing and the prohibition on making assets available; Screening of customers, beneficial owners, agents and counterparties against the DFAT Consolidated List at onboarding and on list updates; Payment and transaction screening configuration and tuning records; Alert disposition records and escalation to DFAT notification where assets are frozen; Testing results of screening effectiveness (fuzzy matching, name variants)
Where programmes usually fall short: Screening only at onboarding, not re-screened when the Consolidated List changes; Beneficial owners and persons acting on behalf of the customer not screened
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)