Drug trafficking proceeds
Which scenarios together reach the patterns of drug proceeds: bulk cash, funnel deposits and transfers to source or transit countries?
A scenario that places here
example"Drug proceeds: bulk cash deposits followed by wires to source countries"
Channels it applies to
3 of the 20 in the dictionaryCSH WIN REM
Cash, branch and ATM, international wires and remittance and money transfer: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.
Obligations
3 regimes| Regime | Obligation |
|---|---|
| Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X) | BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-AML-09 Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) |
| FATF 40 Recommendations | FATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.20 Reporting of suspicious transactions |
| Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia) | AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction Monitoring |
The obligations, quoted
BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction MonitoringAutomated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-AML-09 Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)Institutions shall file SARs with FinCEN within 30 days of detection (or 60 if no subject identified) for transactions meeting reporting thresholds and indicia.
Where programmes usually fall short: Late filings; No documented no-file rationale
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligenceFinancial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.20 Reporting of suspicious transactionsA financial institution that suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing is required by law to report its suspicion promptly to the financial intelligence unit; the Interpretive Note requires reporting of all suspicious transactions including attempted ones, regardless of amount and regardless of whether they involve tax matters.
Where programmes usually fall short: Reporting only above a monetary threshold; Attempted transactions not reported
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction MonitoringSystems and controls for monitoring customer transactions for unusual or suspicious activity.
Where programmes usually fall short: No transaction monitoring
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)