AML Scenario Gap Finder

Terrorist financing indicators

Which scenario reads small, repeated transfers to conflict regions and to people or charities connected to them, where the amounts are too small for any value line?

A scenario that places here

example

"Terrorist financing indicators: small transfers to conflict-zone beneficiaries"

Read this scenario

Channels it applies to

3 of the 20 in the dictionary

WIN P2P REM

International wires, person-to-person payments and remittance and money transfer: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.

Reference lines

held figures

Obligations

3 regimes
RegimeObligation
Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-AML-09 Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)
FATF 40 RecommendationsFATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.20 Reporting of suspicious transactions · FATF R.6 Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours · AML/CTF Act s 41 Report suspicious matters within 3 business days, or 24 hours for terrorism financing

The obligations, quoted

BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring

Automated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.

What an examiner asks to see: TM scenario inventory; Threshold tuning documentation; Above-the-line/below-the-line testing; Model validation reports
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-AML-09 Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR)

Institutions shall file SARs with FinCEN within 30 days of detection (or 60 if no subject identified) for transactions meeting reporting thresholds and indicia.

What an examiner asks to see: SAR filing logs; Investigation case files; SAR decisioning memos; Continuing activity reviews
Where programmes usually fall short: Late filings; No documented no-file rationale
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligence

Financial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.

What an examiner asks to see: CDD policy and procedures with triggers and thresholds; Customer files with identity, beneficial ownership, purpose and risk rating; Ongoing monitoring and periodic review records
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.20 Reporting of suspicious transactions

A financial institution that suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity or are related to terrorist financing is required by law to report its suspicion promptly to the financial intelligence unit; the Interpretive Note requires reporting of all suspicious transactions including attempted ones, regardless of amount and regardless of whether they involve tax matters.

What an examiner asks to see: The legal reporting obligation and its coverage of attempted transactions; STR procedures and filing records; Internal escalation and decision records
Where programmes usually fall short: Reporting only above a monetary threshold; Attempted transactions not reported
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.6 Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing

Countries implement targeted financial sanctions regimes giving effect to the UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism and terrorist financing, freezing without delay the funds and other assets of persons and entities designated by or under the authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII (resolution 1267 and successors) or designated by the country under resolution 1373, and ensuring that no funds or assets are made available to or for their benefit; the Interpretive Note sets the designation authorities and procedures, the freezing obligations without delay and without prior notice, the prohibitions, the communication of designations, the reporting duties of institutions, the delisting and unfreezing procedures and access to frozen funds for basic expenses.

What an examiner asks to see: Legal basis for freezing without delay; Designation and delisting procedures and the competent authority; Communication mechanism for designations to institutions and their reporting of frozen assets
Where programmes usually fall short: Freezing dependent on a court order that takes days; No domestic designation mechanism under resolution 1373
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours

A reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.

What an examiner asks to see: Transaction monitoring rules and scenarios mapped to the entity's risks and to the Rules 6-35 offence list; Scenario tuning and coverage testing records; Alert volumes, disposition and escalation metrics; Manual monitoring procedures for non-automated channels; Model validation of monitoring systems
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 41 Report suspicious matters within 3 business days, or 24 hours for terrorism financing

A suspicious matter reporting obligation arises when an entity provides or proposes to provide a designated service to a person, or is asked or approached about a service it ordinarily provides, and it suspects on reasonable grounds that the person or their agent is not who they claim to be, that information it has may be relevant to investigating or prosecuting tax evasion, a Commonwealth, State or Territory offence, or proceeds of crime enforcement, or that the service is preparatory to, or information relevant to, a financing of terrorism or money laundering offence. The report goes to the AUSTRAC CEO in the approved form with the Rules information and a statement of the grounds for suspicion within 3 business days of forming the suspicion (5 business days where part of the information may be another person's privileged material, with an LPP form), or within 24 hours for terrorism financing. A report may be withheld where all the grounds are privileged. The obligation does not extend to services from foreign establishments (other than item 32A). Reports can be amended or withdrawn only at the AUSTRAC CEO's request (Rules 9-9B). Civil penalty provision.

What an examiner asks to see: SMR procedure and decision records with suspicion date and time; Lodgement confirmations showing timeliness against 3 business days and 24 hours; Quality of the statement of grounds in sampled reports; LPP forms where privilege is claimed; Metrics on SMR volumes and timeliness
Where programmes usually fall short: Clock started at case closure rather than when suspicion formed; Grounds for suspicion stated as a transaction description only
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)

Other typologies in trafficking and other priority red flags