AML Scenario Gap Finder
Regime

FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph: what it asks of a monitoring programme

Recommendation 16 paragraph by paragraph: the originator and beneficiary information a transfer must carry, the de minimis threshold, and what ordering, intermediary and beneficiary institutions do when information is missing or does not align.

Shown for every institution: the international standard every national regime is assessed against.

Typologies anchored here

12
TypologyObligation
Cash withdrawn abroadFATF R.16 INR16.19
Money mulesFATF R.16 INR16.30
Cross-border activity out of profileFATF R.16 INR16.9
Structuring below the funds-transfer recordkeeping lineFATF R.16 INR16.8
Sanctions name screeningFATF R.16 R16-TFS
Missing originator or beneficiary informationFATF R.16 R16-MON · FATF R.16 INR16.9 · FATF R.16 INR16.20 · FATF R.16 INR16.26 · FATF R.16 INR16.28
Beneficiary name does not match the accountFATF R.16 INR16.30 · FATF R.16 INR16.31 · FATF R.16 INR16.29
Account takeoverFATF R.16 INR16.30
Scam payments by the customerFATF R.16 INR16.30
Business email compromiseFATF R.16 INR16.30
Prepaid loading and card cash-outFATF R.16 INR16.17
Transaction laundering through merchantsFATF R.16 INR16.16

Every obligation cited, quoted

13 of the 31 held

The requirement text is our statement of each clause, read against the copy we hold and cited to it; it is not the instrument verbatim. Rows the export flags as shared evidence are never shown.

FATF R.16 INR16.8 Cross-border transfers below the de minimis threshold

Where a country adopts a de minimis threshold for cross-border transfers other than cash withdrawals, set no higher than USD or EUR 1,000, transfers below it carry the names of originator and beneficiary and the account number of each where an account is used (or a unique transaction reference number that permits tracing), and where the funds come from another institution its name and the account number; the information need not be verified unless money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, in which case the institution verifies its own customer's information.

What an examiner asks to see: The national threshold and the institution's rule implementing it; Low-value message samples with names and account or reference numbers; Suspicion-triggered verification records
Where programmes usually fall short: Threshold applied above the USD/EUR 1,000 cap; Reference number absent where no account is used
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.9 Cross-border transfers above the threshold: the full information set

Cross-border transfers above the applicable threshold always carry the names of originator and beneficiary; their account numbers where used, or a unique transaction reference number, with the funding institution's name and account where funds are drawn elsewhere; the originator's address (country and town suffice where no standardised postal address exists) and the beneficiary's country and town or nearest alternative; the originator's date of birth where a natural person (year of birth where the full date is unavailable); and, for a legal person originator or beneficiary, the connected BIC, the Legal Entity Identifier or the unique official identifier where one exists.

What an examiner asks to see: Message samples carrying every required element; Data collection at onboarding for date of birth and legal-person identifiers; LEI and official identifier coverage of the customer base
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficiary address demanded in full where only country and town are required; Date of birth not held for existing customers
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.16 Card payments for goods and services

For transfers flowing from a purchase of goods or services with a credit, debit or prepaid card, the card number accompanies all transfers flowing from the transaction and the name and location of the card-issuing and merchant-acquiring institutions are made available on request, in a timely manner, to the other institutions in the chain and through them to competent authorities, so that everyone can identify which institutions hold the full cardholder and merchant information and in which countries.

What an examiner asks to see: Card scheme rules on card number transmission; Issuer and acquirer identification available through the network; Request handling for issuer and acquirer details
Where programmes usually fall short: Merchants onboarded without CDD treated as goods-and-services purchases; Acquirer location not retrievable
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.17 Card used for other transfers

Where a credit, debit or prepaid card effects another type of payment or value transfer, such as a person-to-person transfer, the transaction is subject to the applicable domestic or cross-border requirements.

What an examiner asks to see: Product rules distinguishing purchases from card-funded transfers; P2P card transfers carrying the full information set; Monitoring of card rails used for transfers
Where programmes usually fall short: P2P transfers on card rails treated as purchases; No originator data captured for card-funded remittances
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.19 Cross-border cash withdrawals

For a cross-border cash withdrawal with a credit, debit or prepaid card through a different institution (not an ATM operated by the institution that holds the account, where the information is otherwise available under Recommendation 18), the card number accompanies the withdrawal and the cardholder's name is sent to the acquiring institution on request within three business days.

What an examiner asks to see: Card number on cross-border withdrawal messages; Procedure for cardholder name requests with the three-day clock; Acquirer request log
Where programmes usually fall short: Cardholder name requests unanswered or late; No distinction between own-network and foreign ATMs
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.20 Ordering institution: required and accurate originator information above the threshold

The ordering institution ensures that cross-border transfers above the de minimis threshold contain required and accurate originator information (verified for accuracy) and required beneficiary information.

What an examiner asks to see: Verification of originator identity and address under CDD; Pre-release checks on message completeness; Exception reports for incomplete outbound messages
Where programmes usually fall short: Originator data taken from the payment instruction without verification; Beneficiary fields left blank when the customer omits them
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.26 Intermediary institution: reasonable measures to identify missing information

An intermediary institution takes reasonable measures, consistent with straight-through processing, to identify cross-border transfers that lack required originator or beneficiary information.

What an examiner asks to see: Automated detection rules for missing fields; Detection statistics; Design record showing compatibility with straight-through processing
Where programmes usually fall short: Detection limited to manual sampling; Rules checking presence but not meaningfulness of fields
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.28 Beneficiary institution: reasonable measures to identify missing information

A beneficiary institution takes reasonable measures, which may include post-event monitoring or real-time monitoring where feasible, to identify cross-border transfers that lack required originator or beneficiary information.

What an examiner asks to see: Monitoring rules for missing originator or beneficiary data; Post-event or real-time monitoring design; Detection statistics
Where programmes usually fall short: Incoming transfers credited with no check on information; Monitoring only for sanctions, not for missing data
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.29 Beneficiary institution: verification of beneficiary identity above the threshold

For cross-border transfers above the de minimis threshold the beneficiary institution verifies the beneficiary's identity, if not previously verified, and keeps the information in accordance with Recommendation 11.

What an examiner asks to see: CDD records for beneficiaries of incoming transfers; Cash payout verification procedures; Retention of beneficiary identity records
Where programmes usually fall short: Cash payouts above the threshold without identification; Reliance on the originator's description of the beneficiary
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.30 Beneficiary institution: detecting misdirected payments through alignment checks

For cross-border transfers above the threshold the information received on the intended beneficiary informs the beneficiary institution's monitoring, aimed at detecting misdirected payments from possible laundering, fraud or error, and it mitigates the risk of transfers reaching an unintended beneficiary through at least one of: a per-transaction check of the extent to which the beneficiary name and account number in the message align with its own records (alignment need not be an exact match and may vary with risk and context); holistic ongoing risk-based monitoring for anomalous accounts, transactions and activity including misaligned beneficiary information; or, where both institutions participate in a pre-validation mechanism such as confirmation or verification of payee, that pre-validation in place of the other two.

What an examiner asks to see: The chosen alignment method and its design; Alignment mismatch handling records; Participation in a confirmation-of-payee scheme where relied on
Where programmes usually fall short: No alignment check of any kind; Exact-match rule generating false rejections without risk basis
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 INR16.31 Beneficiary institution: risk-based policies on execution, rejection or suspension

A beneficiary institution has effective risk-based policies and procedures for deciding when to execute, reject or suspend a transfer that lacks required originator or beneficiary information or that its alignment checks identify as potentially misdirected, and what follow-up action to take.

What an examiner asks to see: Policy on incomplete and misdirected incoming transfers; Case records of holds, returns and follow-up; Link to suspicious transaction reporting
Where programmes usually fall short: Misdirected payments credited and later disputed; Policy silent on follow-up
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 R16-MON Monitoring for transfers lacking required information

Financial institutions monitor payments or value transfers to detect those lacking required originator or beneficiary information and take appropriate measures, which the Interpretive Note specifies for intermediary and beneficiary institutions as reasonable detection measures and risk-based execute, reject or suspend decisions.

What an examiner asks to see: Monitoring rules for missing information across inbound and transit flows; Measures taken on detection; Management reporting on data quality
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring absent for transit flows; Detection with no measures
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
FATF R.16 R16-TFS Freezing action and prohibited transactions with designated persons in the payment chain

In processing payments or value transfers, financial institutions take freezing action and do not conduct transactions with persons and entities designated under the UN Security Council resolutions on terrorism and terrorist financing (resolution 1267 and its successors and resolution 1373) and on the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the Recommendation does not prescribe whether or how message information is screened against sanction lists, since different mechanisms can achieve compliance with targeted financial sanctions.

What an examiner asks to see: Sanctions screening design for payment messages; Freeze and rejection records; List update procedures
Where programmes usually fall short: Screening of originator only, never beneficiary; Designated parties processed because names were unstructured
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph