Money mules
Which scenario looks for an account collecting many small credits from strangers and passing them on the same day?
A scenario that places here
example"Mule pattern: many small inbound transfers swept out the same day"
Channels it applies to
3 of the 20 in the dictionaryACH RTP P2P
ACH and direct entry, real-time payments and person-to-person payments: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.
Obligations
4 regimes| Regime | Obligation |
|---|---|
| Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X) | BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring |
| FATF 40 Recommendations | FATF R.10 Customer due diligence |
| FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph | FATF R.16 INR16.30 Beneficiary institution: detecting misdirected payments through alignment checks |
| Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia) | AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours |
The obligations, quoted
BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction MonitoringAutomated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligenceFinancial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.16 INR16.30 Beneficiary institution: detecting misdirected payments through alignment checksFor cross-border transfers above the threshold the information received on the intended beneficiary informs the beneficiary institution's monitoring, aimed at detecting misdirected payments from possible laundering, fraud or error, and it mitigates the risk of transfers reaching an unintended beneficiary through at least one of: a per-transaction check of the extent to which the beneficiary name and account number in the message align with its own records (alignment need not be an exact match and may vary with risk and context); holistic ongoing risk-based monitoring for anomalous accounts, transactions and activity including misaligned beneficiary information; or, where both institutions participate in a pre-validation mechanism such as confirmation or verification of payee, that pre-validation in place of the other two.
Where programmes usually fall short: No alignment check of any kind; Exact-match rule generating false rejections without risk basis
Source: FATF Recommendation 16, payment transparency, by paragraph
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behavioursA reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)