Correspondent and nested activity
Which scenario reads the respondent bank's own customers' traffic through the correspondent account, including nested banks?
A scenario that places here
example"Correspondent account: nested bank activity through respondent"
Channels it applies to
1 of the 20 in the dictionaryCOR
Correspondent accounts: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.
Obligations
3 regimes| Regime | Obligation |
|---|---|
| Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X) | BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-AML-17 Correspondent Account Due Diligence |
| FATF 40 Recommendations | FATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.13 Correspondent banking |
| Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia) | AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours |
The obligations, quoted
BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction MonitoringAutomated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-AML-17 Correspondent Account Due DiligenceForeign correspondent accounts shall undergo enhanced due diligence including assessing AML controls of the respondent bank.
Where programmes usually fall short: No annual refresh; Nested relationships not identified
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligenceFinancial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.13 Correspondent bankingFor cross-border correspondent banking and similar relationships, financial institutions, beyond normal CDD, gather enough information to understand the respondent's business and to determine from public information its reputation and the quality of its supervision including any money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action, assess its AML/CFT controls, obtain senior management approval before establishing new relationships, clearly understand each institution's responsibilities, and for payable-through accounts satisfy themselves that the respondent has conducted CDD on customers with direct access and can supply CDD information on request; they may not enter into or continue a correspondent relationship with a shell bank and must satisfy themselves that respondents do not allow their accounts to be used by shell banks; the Interpretive Note extends the requirements to similar relationships such as those for securities transactions or funds transfers.
Where programmes usually fall short: Respondent reviewed once and never reassessed; Responsibilities for payable-through accounts undefined
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behavioursA reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)