AML Scenario Gap Finder

Correspondent and nested activity

Which scenario reads the respondent bank's own customers' traffic through the correspondent account, including nested banks?

A scenario that places here

example

"Correspondent account: nested bank activity through respondent"

Read this scenario

Channels it applies to

1 of the 20 in the dictionary

COR

Correspondent accounts: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.

Obligations

3 regimes
RegimeObligation
Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-AML-17 Correspondent Account Due Diligence
FATF 40 RecommendationsFATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.13 Correspondent banking
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction Monitoring

The obligations, quoted

BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring

Automated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.

What an examiner asks to see: TM scenario inventory; Threshold tuning documentation; Above-the-line/below-the-line testing; Model validation reports
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-AML-17 Correspondent Account Due Diligence

Foreign correspondent accounts shall undergo enhanced due diligence including assessing AML controls of the respondent bank.

What an examiner asks to see: Wolfsberg questionnaires; Respondent AML programme reviews; Senior approval
Where programmes usually fall short: No annual refresh; Nested relationships not identified
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligence

Financial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.

What an examiner asks to see: CDD policy and procedures with triggers and thresholds; Customer files with identity, beneficial ownership, purpose and risk rating; Ongoing monitoring and periodic review records
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.13 Correspondent banking

For cross-border correspondent banking and similar relationships, financial institutions, beyond normal CDD, gather enough information to understand the respondent's business and to determine from public information its reputation and the quality of its supervision including any money laundering or terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action, assess its AML/CFT controls, obtain senior management approval before establishing new relationships, clearly understand each institution's responsibilities, and for payable-through accounts satisfy themselves that the respondent has conducted CDD on customers with direct access and can supply CDD information on request; they may not enter into or continue a correspondent relationship with a shell bank and must satisfy themselves that respondents do not allow their accounts to be used by shell banks; the Interpretive Note extends the requirements to similar relationships such as those for securities transactions or funds transfers.

What an examiner asks to see: Correspondent due diligence files and control assessments; Senior management approvals of new relationships; Shell bank attestations and checks
Where programmes usually fall short: Respondent reviewed once and never reassessed; Responsibilities for payable-through accounts undefined
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction Monitoring

Systems and controls for monitoring customer transactions for unusual or suspicious activity.

What an examiner asks to see: Transaction monitoring system & rules; Alert investigation records
Where programmes usually fall short: No transaction monitoring
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)

Other typologies in peps, private banking and correspondents