Politically exposed persons
Which scenario gives PEP relationships their own, lower lines and a comparison against declared source of wealth?
A scenario that places here
example"PEP account activity above profile"
Channels it applies to
3 of the 20 in the dictionaryCSH WDM WIN
Cash, branch and ATM, domestic wires and international wires: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.
Obligations
3 regimes| Regime | Obligation |
|---|---|
| Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X) | BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-CDD-4 Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) |
| FATF 40 Recommendations | FATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.12 Politically exposed persons |
| Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia) | AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction Monitoring · AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartB-PEP Politically Exposed Persons · AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartB-ECDD Enhanced Customer Due Diligence |
The obligations, quoted
BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction MonitoringAutomated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-CDD-4 Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD)Higher-risk customers (PEPs, foreign correspondents, private banking) require enhanced due diligence including additional information collection, source of funds/wealth, senior management approval, and enhanced ongoing monitoring (31 U.S.C. 5318(i), 31 CFR 1010.610, 1010.620).
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial ownership data incomplete; Monitoring scenarios not tuned to risk
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligenceFinancial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.12 Politically exposed personsIn relation to foreign PEPs as customers or beneficial owners, financial institutions, beyond normal CDD, have risk-management systems to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP, obtain senior management approval to establish or continue the relationship, take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring; they take reasonable measures to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or a person entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation and apply the same three measures where the relationship is higher risk; the requirements extend to family members and close associates; the Interpretive Note extends the measures to beneficiaries and beneficial owners of beneficiaries of life insurance policies.
Where programmes usually fall short: Screening limited to foreign PEPs; Family members and close associates not covered
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction MonitoringSystems and controls for monitoring customer transactions for unusual or suspicious activity.
Where programmes usually fall short: No transaction monitoring
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartB-PEP Politically Exposed PersonsProcedures for identifying customers and beneficial owners who are Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).
Where programmes usually fall short: PEPs not identified or escalated
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartB-ECDD Enhanced Customer Due DiligenceEnhanced CDD must be applied in high-risk scenarios with additional identification, verification and monitoring steps.
Where programmes usually fall short: No ECDD for high-risk customers
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)