AML Scenario Gap Finder

Politically exposed persons

Which scenario gives PEP relationships their own, lower lines and a comparison against declared source of wealth?

A scenario that places here

example

"PEP account activity above profile"

Read this scenario

Channels it applies to

3 of the 20 in the dictionary

CSH WDM WIN

Cash, branch and ATM, domestic wires and international wires: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.

Obligations

3 regimes
RegimeObligation
Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-CDD-4 Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD)
FATF 40 RecommendationsFATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.12 Politically exposed persons
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours · AML/CTF Act s 28(2)(e) Politically exposed person and sanctions determination; source of wealth and funds for PEPs · AML/CTF Act s 32 Enhanced CDD when risk is high and in the mandatory cases

The obligations, quoted

BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring

Automated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.

What an examiner asks to see: TM scenario inventory; Threshold tuning documentation; Above-the-line/below-the-line testing; Model validation reports
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-CDD-4 Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD)

Higher-risk customers (PEPs, foreign correspondents, private banking) require enhanced due diligence including additional information collection, source of funds/wealth, senior management approval, and enhanced ongoing monitoring (31 U.S.C. 5318(i), 31 CFR 1010.610, 1010.620).

What an examiner asks to see: AML program documentation; KYC and CDD records; Transaction monitoring scenarios and tuning; SAR/STR filing register; Independent AML audit reports
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial ownership data incomplete; Monitoring scenarios not tuned to risk
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligence

Financial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.

What an examiner asks to see: CDD policy and procedures with triggers and thresholds; Customer files with identity, beneficial ownership, purpose and risk rating; Ongoing monitoring and periodic review records
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.12 Politically exposed persons

In relation to foreign PEPs as customers or beneficial owners, financial institutions, beyond normal CDD, have risk-management systems to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a PEP, obtain senior management approval to establish or continue the relationship, take reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds, and conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring; they take reasonable measures to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP or a person entrusted with a prominent function by an international organisation and apply the same three measures where the relationship is higher risk; the requirements extend to family members and close associates; the Interpretive Note extends the measures to beneficiaries and beneficial owners of beneficiaries of life insurance policies.

What an examiner asks to see: PEP screening system and its coverage of domestic and international-organisation PEPs; Senior management approvals and source of wealth records; Enhanced monitoring rules for PEP relationships
Where programmes usually fall short: Screening limited to foreign PEPs; Family members and close associates not covered
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours

A reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.

What an examiner asks to see: Transaction monitoring rules and scenarios mapped to the entity's risks and to the Rules 6-35 offence list; Scenario tuning and coverage testing records; Alert volumes, disposition and escalation metrics; Manual monitoring procedures for non-automated channels; Model validation of monitoring systems
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 28(2)(e) Politically exposed person and sanctions determination; source of wealth and funds for PEPs

Initial CDD must establish whether the customer, any beneficial owner, any person on whose behalf the customer receives the service or any person acting for it is a politically exposed person (domestic, foreign or international organisation, including family members and close associates) or a person designated for targeted financial sanctions. Where a foreign PEP is involved, or a domestic or international organisation PEP and the customer's ML/TF risk is high, the entity must also establish the PEP's source of wealth and source of funds (Rules 6-23). The involvement of a foreign PEP also makes enhanced CDD mandatory (s 32(c)).

What an examiner asks to see: PEP screening at onboarding for all relevant persons, with list source and match handling; PEP classification (foreign, domestic, international organisation, family member, close associate); Source of wealth and funds evidence for relevant PEPs; Sanctions screening results for the same persons
Where programmes usually fall short: Only the account holder screened, not beneficial owners or agents; Family members and close associates not in scope of screening
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 32 Enhanced CDD when risk is high and in the mandatory cases

Enhanced CDD measures appropriate to the customer's risk must be applied in initial and ongoing CDD where the customer's ML/TF risk is high; a suspicious matter reporting obligation has arisen and the entity proposes to continue serving the customer; the customer or an associated person is a foreign PEP; the customer or an associated person is in, or was formed in, a jurisdiction for which the FATF has called for enhanced due diligence; the service is part of a nested services relationship; or the Rules specify (Rules 6-20: services with no apparent economic or legal purpose, unusually complex or large transactions, unusual patterns). (One Rules case, on physical currency received in an exchange service this tool does not cover, is left out.) Where enhanced CDD applies for high risk, a suspicion or a FATF-listed jurisdiction, source of wealth and source of funds become initial CDD matters where relevant to the risk (Rules 6-21).

What an examiner asks to see: Enhanced CDD procedure listing every mandatory trigger; Enhanced CDD files: source of wealth and funds evidence, senior management approval, enhanced monitoring; FATF high-risk jurisdiction list maintenance and screening; Records of continued-relationship decisions after SMRs
Where programmes usually fall short: FATF call-for-action jurisdictions not screened for formation or presence; Customers kept after an SMR without enhanced CDD
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)

Other typologies in peps, private banking and correspondents