Money services business customers
Which scenario reads the flows of money services business customers against their registration and expected volumes, and catches unregistered ones?
A scenario that places here
example"MSB customer: cash volume above registered profile"
Channels it applies to
3 of the 20 in the dictionaryCSH WDM REM
Cash, branch and ATM, domestic wires and remittance and money transfer: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.
Reference lines
held figures- BSA BSA-AML-10 names USD 10,000 for the currency transaction report on cash, branch and ATM. A scenario of this typology starting above it is flagged "above the reporting threshold".
- AML/CTF Act s 43 names A$10,000 for the threshold transaction report on cash, branch and ATM. A scenario of this typology starting above it is flagged "above the reporting threshold".
Obligations
3 regimes| Regime | Obligation |
|---|---|
| Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X) | BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring |
| FATF 40 Recommendations | FATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.14 Money or value transfer services |
| Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia) | AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours · AML/CTF Act s 28(3) Identity verification, the customer's ML/TF risk and risk-based KYC collection and verification |
The obligations, quoted
BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction MonitoringAutomated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligenceFinancial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.14 Money or value transfer servicesCountries ensure that providers of money or value transfer services are licensed or registered and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant Recommendations, act to identify and sanction unlicensed or unregistered providers, require agents to be licensed or registered or the provider to keep a current list of agents accessible to competent authorities in every country where it and its agents operate, and ensure that providers include their agents in their AML/CFT programmes and monitor their compliance; the Interpretive Note adds that where agents are not themselves licensed the provider is responsible for them.
Where programmes usually fall short: Informal value transfer operating without detection; Agents outside any AML programme
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behavioursA reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 28(3) Identity verification, the customer's ML/TF risk and risk-based KYC collection and verificationTo establish the s 28(2) matters the entity must: for an individual, take reasonable steps to establish the customer is who they claim to be; identify the customer's ML/TF risk from KYC information reasonably available before commencing, taking into account (for Australian establishments) its ML/TF risk assessment, the kind of customer, the designated services, the delivery channels, the countries dealt with and Rules matters; collect KYC information appropriate to that risk; and verify, using reliable and independent data, so much of it as is appropriate to that risk. Collection and verification may be done by an agent, the entity remaining liable (s 37). Where an individual genuinely cannot obtain or access identity evidence, the matter is taken to be established if reasonable steps were taken, the risk-based steps were followed using reasonably available data and additional risk is managed under the policies (Rules 6-10).
Where programmes usually fall short: Customer risk rating assigned after onboarding or not at all; Same verification depth for all risk levels
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)