Money services business customers
Which scenario reads the flows of money services business customers against their registration and expected volumes, and catches unregistered ones?
A scenario that places here
example"MSB customer: cash volume above registered profile"
Channels it applies to
3 of the 20 in the dictionaryCSH WDM REM
Cash, branch and ATM, domestic wires and remittance and money transfer: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.
Reference lines
held figures- BSA BSA-AML-10 names USD 10,000 for the currency transaction report on cash, branch and ATM. A scenario of this typology starting above it is flagged "above the reporting threshold".
- AUSTRAC AMLCTF-43 names A$10,000 for the threshold transaction report on cash, branch and ATM. A scenario of this typology starting above it is flagged "above the reporting threshold".
Obligations
3 regimes| Regime | Obligation |
|---|---|
| Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X) | BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring |
| FATF 40 Recommendations | FATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.14 Money or value transfer services |
| Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia) | AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction Monitoring · AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartB-RBA Risk-Based Approach to CDD |
The obligations, quoted
BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction MonitoringAutomated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligenceFinancial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.14 Money or value transfer servicesCountries ensure that providers of money or value transfer services are licensed or registered and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring compliance with the relevant Recommendations, act to identify and sanction unlicensed or unregistered providers, require agents to be licensed or registered or the provider to keep a current list of agents accessible to competent authorities in every country where it and its agents operate, and ensure that providers include their agents in their AML/CFT programmes and monitor their compliance; the Interpretive Note adds that where agents are not themselves licensed the provider is responsible for them.
Where programmes usually fall short: Informal value transfer operating without detection; Agents outside any AML programme
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction MonitoringSystems and controls for monitoring customer transactions for unusual or suspicious activity.
Where programmes usually fall short: No transaction monitoring
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartB-RBA Risk-Based Approach to CDDCustomer due diligence procedures must be based on the level of ML/TF risk that different customers pose.
Where programmes usually fall short: CDD not risk-based
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)