AML Scenario Gap Finder

Charities and non-profits

Which scenario reads a charity's transfers to places and partners its stated purpose does not explain?

A scenario that places here

example

"Charity accounts sending funds to conflict regions"

Read this scenario

Channels it applies to

2 of the 20 in the dictionary

ACH WIN

ACH and direct entry and international wires: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.

Reference lines

held figures

Obligations

3 regimes
RegimeObligation
Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring
FATF 40 RecommendationsFATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.8 Non-profit organisations
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction Monitoring

The obligations, quoted

BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring

Automated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.

What an examiner asks to see: TM scenario inventory; Threshold tuning documentation; Above-the-line/below-the-line testing; Model validation reports
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligence

Financial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.

What an examiner asks to see: CDD policy and procedures with triggers and thresholds; Customer files with identity, beneficial ownership, purpose and risk rating; Ongoing monitoring and periodic review records
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.8 Non-profit organisations

Countries identify the organisations that fall within the FATF definition of non-profit organisations, assess their terrorist financing risks, and apply focused, proportionate and risk-based measures that protect them from abuse by terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities, as conduits for terrorist financing including to escape asset freezing, and through concealed diversion of funds intended for legitimate purposes, without unduly disrupting or discouraging legitimate NPO activity; the Interpretive Note covers outreach, risk-based supervision, effective investigation and information gathering and international cooperation, and warns against applying the measures to the whole sector.

What an examiner asks to see: Identification of the NPO subset at risk and its risk assessment; Outreach and guidance to the sector; Risk-based supervisory measures rather than blanket controls
Where programmes usually fall short: All NPOs treated as high risk; Measures that de-risk or discourage legitimate activity
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AUSTRAC AMLCTF-PartA-TxnMon Transaction Monitoring

Systems and controls for monitoring customer transactions for unusual or suspicious activity.

What an examiner asks to see: Transaction monitoring system & rules; Alert investigation records
Where programmes usually fall short: No transaction monitoring
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act (Australia)

Other typologies in peps, private banking and correspondents