New accounts with outsized activity
Which scenario reads the first weeks of a new account, before any history exists to compare it with?
A scenario that places here
example"New account: high value inbound in first 30 days"
Channels it applies to
6 of the 20 in the dictionaryCSH RDC ACH WDM RTP P2P
Cash, branch and ATM, remote deposit capture, ACH and direct entry, domestic wires, real-time payments and person-to-person payments: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.
Obligations
3 regimes| Regime | Obligation |
|---|---|
| Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X) | BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-CIP-1 Customer Identification Program (CIP) |
| FATF 40 Recommendations | FATF R.10 Customer due diligence |
| Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia) | AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours · AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(b)-(c) Review the assessment of the customer's ML/TF risk and refresh KYC information |
The obligations, quoted
BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction MonitoringAutomated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-CIP-1 Customer Identification Program (CIP)Banks must implement a written CIP appropriate for their size and type, which must include procedures for obtaining minimum identifying information from each customer opening an account: name, date of birth, address, and identification number (SSN or TIN) (31 CFR 1020.220).
Where programmes usually fall short: Policy not aligned to control statement; Procedure undocumented
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligenceFinancial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behavioursA reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(b)-(c) Review the assessment of the customer's ML/TF risk and refresh KYC informationFor business relationships the entity must review and where appropriate update its assessment of the customer's ML/TF risk when a s 28(4) risk matter changes significantly, when unusual transactions or behaviours arise, and when the Rules require (a nested services customer at least every 2 years); and review, update and reverify KYC information at a frequency appropriate to the customer's risk, when it doubts the adequacy or veracity of KYC information, and when the Rules require (a customer or associated person becoming a foreign PEP, or a high-risk domestic or international organisation PEP, Rules 6-24; nested services customers every 2 years or when a new kind of nested service starts, Rules 6-26). Where enhanced CDD applies because of high risk, a suspicion or a high-risk jurisdiction, the refresh must ensure source of wealth and funds information is held where relevant (Rules 6-21).
Where programmes usually fall short: Risk ratings set at onboarding and never revisited; No trigger-based reviews after unusual activity
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)