AML Scenario Gap Finder

High-risk jurisdictions

Which scenario reads transfers to and from the countries the institution rates higher risk, and when was that country list last refreshed?

A scenario that places here

example

"High-risk jurisdiction wires > 25,000"

Read this scenario

Channels it applies to

4 of the 20 in the dictionary

WIN REM FXC COR

International wires, remittance and money transfer, foreign exchange and correspondent accounts: one sector each on the coverage chart, hatched where no scenario reaches it.

Reference lines

held figures

Obligations

3 regimes
RegimeObligation
Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring · BSA BSA-AML-23 Section 311 Special Measures
FATF 40 RecommendationsFATF R.10 Customer due diligence · FATF R.19 Higher-risk countries
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours · AML/CTF Act s 46 Report international value transfer services within 10 business days

The obligations, quoted

BSA BSA-AML-15 Transaction Monitoring

Automated and manual transaction monitoring shall identify unusual or suspicious activity using risk-based scenarios and thresholds.

What an examiner asks to see: TM scenario inventory; Threshold tuning documentation; Above-the-line/below-the-line testing; Model validation reports
Where programmes usually fall short: No model validation; Scenarios not aligned to risk assessment
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
BSA BSA-AML-23 Section 311 Special Measures

Institutions shall implement FinCEN Section 311 special measures against jurisdictions, institutions or transactions of primary money laundering concern.

What an examiner asks to see: 311 designations register; Account/transaction restrictions evidence
Where programmes usually fall short: No process to ingest new 311 measures; Restrictions not enforced
Source: Bank Secrecy Act and its regulations (31 CFR Chapter X)
FATF R.10 Customer due diligence

Financial institutions may not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in obviously fictitious names and must, by a principle set out in law, undertake customer due diligence when establishing a business relationship, carrying out an occasional transaction above USD or EUR 15,000 or a payment or value transfer covered by INR.16, when money laundering or terrorist financing is suspected, or when they doubt previously obtained identification data: identify and verify the customer from reliable independent sources; identify the beneficial owner and take reasonable measures to verify that identity, understanding the ownership and control structure of legal persons and arrangements; understand and where appropriate obtain information on the purpose and intended nature of the relationship; and conduct ongoing due diligence and transaction scrutiny consistent with the customer's profile including, where necessary, the source of funds. The extent of each measure follows a risk-based approach; verification takes place before or during establishment of the relationship, or as soon as reasonably practicable after it where risks are managed and business would otherwise be interrupted; an institution that cannot complete CDD does not open the account or perform the transaction, or terminates the relationship, and considers a suspicious transaction report; the requirements apply to new customers and, on materiality and risk, to existing ones. The Interpretive Note sets the risk-based approach, enhanced and simplified measures, the specific measures for legal persons, arrangements and beneficiaries of life insurance, reliance on prior verification and the timing rules.

What an examiner asks to see: CDD policy and procedures with triggers and thresholds; Customer files with identity, beneficial ownership, purpose and risk rating; Ongoing monitoring and periodic review records
Where programmes usually fall short: Beneficial owner identified but never verified; Ownership and control structure of corporate customers not understood
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
FATF R.19 Higher-risk countries

Financial institutions apply enhanced due diligence, effective and proportionate to the risk, to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons and financial institutions from countries for which the FATF calls for it, and countries can apply appropriate, effective and proportionate countermeasures when the FATF calls for them and independently of any such call; the Interpretive Note lists possible countermeasures, from enhanced reporting and limits on correspondent relationships to prohibiting the establishment of branches, and requires measures to advise institutions of concerns about other countries' weaknesses.

What an examiner asks to see: Procedure implementing FATF public statements on high-risk and monitored jurisdictions; Enhanced due diligence measures applied to those countries; Legal basis for countermeasures
Where programmes usually fall short: FATF lists not translated into institutional controls; No ability to apply countermeasures without a FATF call
Source: FATF 40 Recommendations
AML/CTF Act s 30(2)(a) Ongoing monitoring for unusual transactions and behaviours

A reporting entity must monitor its customers to appropriately identify, assess, manage and mitigate its ML, TF and proliferation financing risks, and (for Australian establishments) monitor for unusual transactions and behaviours that may give rise to a suspicious matter reporting obligation. Unusual includes unusually large or complex transactions, unusual patterns, activity with no apparent economic or lawful purpose, and activity inconsistent with what the entity knows about the customer, the relationship, the customer's risk or source of funds or wealth. Rules 6-35: monitoring must cover all s 41(1)(d) to (j) grounds and, for offences, at least money laundering, terrorism and its financing, proliferation financing, sanctions breaches, organised crime, hate groups, human trafficking and people smuggling, sexual exploitation, drug, arms and goods trafficking, corruption and bribery, counterfeiting, fraud including scams and identity theft, tax crime, extortion, forgery, piracy, insider trading and market manipulation, environmental crime, robbery, kidnapping, smuggling, murder and grievous bodily harm, cybercrime and any offence the program rates high risk. Intermediary institutions must monitor item 31 services likewise (s 39F(2)). Civil penalty per service.

What an examiner asks to see: Transaction monitoring rules and scenarios mapped to the entity's risks and to the Rules 6-35 offence list; Scenario tuning and coverage testing records; Alert volumes, disposition and escalation metrics; Manual monitoring procedures for non-automated channels; Model validation of monitoring systems
Where programmes usually fall short: Monitoring scenarios cover only structuring and large cash; Products or channels not fed into the monitoring system (data gaps)
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)
AML/CTF Act s 46 Report international value transfer services within 10 business days

An entity that commences to provide an international value transfer service (an item 29 or 30 transfer taking value into or out of Australia, Rules 8-9 defining where value is) through an Australian establishment must report it to the AUSTRAC CEO within 10 business days after passing on or receiving the transfer message, in the approved form or Rules manner. No report is needed if within that period it reasonably determines the transfer will not occur and takes reasonable steps to stop it. The obligation may, or where the Rules require must, be discharged by an intermediary institution under a written agreement. For registered remittance affiliates the obligation falls on the network provider (Rules 9-10). Civil penalty provision.

What an examiner asks to see: IFTI or IVTS report lodgement records and reconciliation to payment volumes; Agreements where an intermediary reports on the entity's behalf; Procedure for cancelled transfers
Where programmes usually fall short: Inbound transfers not reported; Reports missing where intermediary reporting was assumed but not agreed
Source: Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act and Rules (Australia)

Other typologies in high-risk geography and cross-border